The Rise of Dick Smith Electronics Across Australia’s Retail Market

The Rise of Dick Smith Electronics Across Australia’s Retail Market

Shivangi
Mar 28, 2026 7:41 PM IST
Category Business
The Rise of Dick Smith Electronics Across Australia’s Retail Market

Synopsis

After Dick Smith’s dramatic collapse in 2016, most believed the brand was finished. However, Kogan saw value where others didn’t. By acquiring only the digital assets—brand name, website, and customer database—Kogan rebuilt Dick Smith as a lean, online-only retailer. Without the burden of physical stores, debt, or excess inventory, the business quickly returned to profitability. This case highlights how a strong brand can survive failure and thrive under a new model, offering valuable lessons in cost control, inventory management, and the power of e-commerce transformation.

Dick Smith Electronics went bust in January 2016. The reasons were well known, the business had been purchasing the wrong inventory, opening too many locations and spending money it did not have. All 363 shops in Australia and New Zealand shut. It cost three thousand people their jobs. The suppliers, landlords and trade partners owed money received zero in return. Unsecured creditors’ total shortfall was $260 million.

Whatever remained after that collapse, it was not a business. The stores were gone. The staff were gone. The debt had swallowed everything. But one thing remained, the name. The Dick Smith brand, the trademark, the website and the customer database were still alive. And it was those things, not the business, that became the starting point for what followed.

01
Chapter one

The Acquisition

In March 2016, Ruslan Kogan, the founder of Australian e-commerce company Kogan.com, purchased the Dick Smith digital assets as receivers were still wrapping up a handful of physical stores. Kogan bought the Dick Smith website, brand name and customer database, which had 1.2 million active subscribers at the time for $2.6 million.

It is critical to understand this distinction. Kogan did not buy the stores. He assumed none of the leases, no leftover stock and no debt. He purchased the name, the website and the customer list of people who had previously shopped with Dick Smith. That was it. Everything that had so many costs associated with the original business, the 363 stores, the rent, the staff, he binned, entirely.

That one decision is the best recovery story. Dick Smith’s original failure didn’t stem from a bad name or customers losing faith in the brand. It failed because how the business was run was far too expensive and not well-managed enough to succeed. Kogan did not attempt to correct any of this. He started over with only the pieces that still mattered.

02
Chapter two

The Rebuild

When Kogan acquired the brand his technology team had one task, create a functioning online store for Dick Smith from nothing. This involved designing new websites for Australia and New Zealand, establishing order fulfilment, customer service and payment systems, from the bottom up. They were on the same technology platform that was also running Kogan.com and added on top of it, Dick Smith. No new staff were hired. No assistants from the outside were brought in.

The Dick Smith online shop was introduced in May 2016, one day after the final physical Dick Smith stores closed for good. The timing was deliberate. Kogan acted quickly because he had the means to do so. The customer database included in the acquisition meant there were already more than a million people to reach out to on day one. The brand name assumed those people already knew what Dick Smith was and what it sold.

How products were bought and sold also changed entirely. Under the previous management, they were buying stock in massive quantities in order to earn rebates from their suppliers and book those rebates as profit, which was exactly what packed the warehouses with twelve years of batteries nobody wanted. Kogan was run based on what customers wanted and bought online. Because Kogan.com and Dick Smith were now pooling their purchases from suppliers, they were combining purchasing power as a result, which equated to better prices from suppliers, and those savings would go on to customers. The entire model was more straightforward, less expensive and centred on what people actually wanted.

03
Chapter three

Financial Performance Under New Ownership

The initial numbers were reported quickly. Dick Smith contributed $6.5 million in revenue during its first two months of Kogan-led trading, and those figures directly helped the Kogan beat its own forecast for the financial year. That was a strong early sign for a brand that had been in administration only months before.

The first full year told an even clearer story. Kogan posted total revenue of $289.5 million for the twelve months ending 30 June 2017, an increase of 37.1 per cent on the year prior, and a net profit of $7.2 million, or up 800 per cent compared to the previous year’s $800,000 profit. The company’s revenue was $48.3 million above what it had forecast, with the relaunch of Dick Smith one of the chief reasons for that result.

These inventory numbers are also something to pay attention to. As at the end of FY2017, Kogan’s total inventory across the entire business was $39.7 million and it had a net cash balance position of $32m. By comparison, when the original Dick Smith fell over, it was sitting on $371 million in unsaleable stock. The difference is not small. It mirrors two perfectly opposite approaches to the same type of business.

Kogan’s active customer base surged 36 per cent to 955,000 users in that time, while its total subscriber count across all of its brands including Dick Smith was at 6.5 million. The Dick Smith database customers were returning to the brand and buying again, and that showed us the name still resonated with people after all that had happened.

04
Chapter four

Why the Recovery Worked

The collapse and the comeback came down to three things.

The first was the cost base. The old Dick Smith had rent and staffing charges to meet for 363 stores each month, busy or otherwise. Those were fixed costs, leaving the business no leeway to recover when sales fell. The online model did not have any of that overhead. If something wasn’t working it could be adjusted quickly and inexpensively.

The second was how the stock was managed. The original business purchased goods to access rebates and meet paper profit goals. The new business purchased products because customers wanted them. That’s a modest distinction but it transformed everything about how cash flowed through the operation.

The third was that Kogan had the infrastructure already built. He did not have to create a warehouse network; hire a fulfilment team, or develop a new technology platform. He simply built upon what had already been there. Few elephants have skied in, and the cost of doing Dick Smith was low. The payoff, an established brand name and, from day one, 1.2 million customers, was immediate.

05
Chapter five

Longer Term

Dick Smith continued to trade as a Kogan brand in the Kogan portfolio well after the initial turnaround. Kogan expanded over the years into a wider range of brands such as Kogan Mobile, Kogan Insurance, Kogan Travel and Matt Blatt, with Dick Smith being one of the consumer electronics brands under that portfolio. As late as early 2016 the brand had closed 363 stores and left $260 million in unpaid debts, but by the end of 2017, they were one of the few brands to make a meaningful contribution for what was one of ASX’s better performing companies that year.

06
Chapter six

Summary

The Dick Smith turnaround exemplifies the distinction between a brand and a business. The business, the stores, the debt, the busted buying model, was not saved and could not be saved. But the brand was worth something that had survived its collapse. Customers still knew the name. They had still linked it to electronics. And when there was a reason to shop with it again they did.

Kogan paid $2.6 million for a brand that had once been worth $520 million. He removed everything that had created the failure, reshaped it on the infrastructure that already existed, and put the operation back into profit in two months. It was at the end of its first full financial year contributing to 800 per cent net profit growth for its parent company.

As a recovery, it’s one of the simplest and well-documented examples in recent Australian business history, not because it’s complex, but because it isn’t. And it worked because the new owner knew precisely what he was buying and precisely what he was not.


To read more such business success stories from around the world, follow inspireprenuer magazine

Written by Shivangi

At Inspirepreneurs Magazine, covering entrepreneurship, business failures, and the human stories behind the world's most ambitious founders. She writes at the intersection of strategy and storytelling.